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No subject is of greater concern that the stability of the economy.   Elections are won and 
lost on the basis of the economy’s short run performance.   Yet few questions are more 
controversial.  In Europe, there is a debate about whether the stability pact and the central 
bank’s exclusive focus on inflation is the cornerstone of a successful stabilization policy, 
or whether these institutional structures are dooming Europe to an extended period of 
weakness, if not recession.  In the United States, the Republicans have become 
Keynesians, arguing that the deficits will provide the stimulation the economy needs, 
while the Democrats argue not only that the deficits will be a drag on the economy, and 
that the particular tax cuts will provide little stimulation.  In Argentina, Korea, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, the IMF advocated contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in the 
context of clear signs of severe economic downturns.   
 
It is important to understand the sources of the differences in these policy stances:  Is it 
because of differences in objectives or models?  In judgments about empirical 
parameters?  In this paper, I try to answer these questions within a fairly general 
framework.   
 
Our focus is on stabilization within developing countries.  There are marked differences 
between developing countries and developed countries, and amongst developing 
countries.  Easterly et al [2000] provides a brief description of some of the differences:  
there is, for instance, more economic volatility in developing countries, making the 
attention on stabilization particularly relevant.  Though in general there is more wage and 
price volatility, in some regions such volatility is far greater than in others.  In some 
regions, financial markets (which play an important role in many economic crises) are far 
more developed than in others; and securities markets, which are essential for risk 
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sharing, while a limited source of finance for new investment even in the most advanced 
industrial countries2, are particularly weak in most developing countries.  While in more 
developed countries, there has been increasing concern about the efficacy of monetary 
policy, which focuses on banks as a source of credit, as the role of banks in finance has 
diminished3, in most developing countries banks remain the most important source of 
finance; but with money and credit playing a far less important role in some of the 
poorest developing countries, in these countries too the scope for monetary policy may be 
limited.   
 
Objectives.   
 
We begin our discussion by focusing on objectives.  At the most abstract level, the 
objective of economic policy can be thought of as maximizing long run societal well 
being, taking into account notions of equity, both amongst those alive today, and between 
the current generation and future generations. 
 
Any focus on societal well being for developing countries has to take into account how 
stabilization policies today affect growth and development.  A focus on equity needs to 
take particular account of those who are most disadvantaged, i.e. assess the impact of 
stabilization policies on poverty.   
 
We focus on individual well being, and accordingly, must take into account that 
individuals are risk averse, that is, value economic security.  There is, from this 
perspective, a high cost associated with economic structures that expose individuals to 
risk, and a high value associated with risk mitigation (e.g. unemployment insurance.)  If 
individuals are credit rationed, that is, cannot borrow as much as they would like, then 
individual well being can be enhanced by economic policies that allow them to smooth 
their consumption, by borrowing more today than the markets would allow them.    
 
The discussion of the preceding paragraph has focused on economic well being, but there 
are broader values, and economics is set within a social context.  For instance, economic 
policies which are likely to give rise to riots are objectionable, not just because of the loss 
of income, or even because of the uncertainty about future loss of income to which they 
give rise.  There are social costs of unemployment which go well beyond the loss of 
income. 
 
Note that certain commonly found formulations can be viewed as limiting cases of that 
presented here.  If all individuals are identical and have utility functions which are linear 
in income and leisure (up to, say, some maximum amount), and if society is indifferent as 
to distribution, then we can look only aggregate income and aggregate labor; 
alternatively, if individuals are identical, and the market always “shares work,” then we 
can evaluate the outcomes in terms of a “money” metric of that representative 
individual’s utility.  Under these circumstances, it can be argued4 that the cost of 
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unemployment is typically low, since the reduced income is minimal, particularly when v 
viewed from a lifetime perspective.  Similarly, even if individuals are risk averse, but 
they can insure themselves fully against unemployment, or self insure by spreading the 
costs over their lifetime, the costs of income volatility for most individuals will be 
relatively small.   
 
For most developing countries, however, individuals are very risk averse, often face 
credit constraints, cannot spread easily losses of income resulting from temporary 
unemployment over their lifetime, the incidence of reduced hours is not spread evenly 
throughout the population, and so representative agent models, and especially those 
which assume the ability to smooth consumption over a lifetime, provide little insight 
into the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations, and therefore little insight into the 
appropriate policies to be followed. 
 
Notice that in this formulation, inflation does not appear as an explicit variable.  It is an 
intermediate variable, which may, or may not, affect the variables which are of direct 
interest, e.g. growth rates and their variability.  Inflation should be a target of economic 
policy only when the impact of policies on the variables which are of direct concern 
cannot easily and directly be assessed.    (For instance, if the link between monetary 
policy and future growth is highly uncertain, but, if the link between inflation and growth 
is well established, when the impact of monetary policy on inflation can be assessed, then 
the impact of monetary policy on growth can be assessed, and then inflation becomes an 
intermediate variable upon which attention should be focused. 
 
On the other hand, because unemployment may itself have social consequences—and is a 
surrogate for an inequality in the consumption of labor services—unemployment may 
appropriately appear explicitly as an object of concern of macro-economic policy. 
 
In this formulation, the link between stabilization policies and growth should explicitly 
take into account.   Only if current actions have no effects on future growth can one focus 
exclusively on current output and employment. 
 
The link between current policies and future growth has not only been given short shrift 
in much traditional discussions of macro-economic stabilization, but to the extent that it 
has been discussed, there is little agreement even on the “signs.”  For instance, the IMF 
often advices countries to face the pain of adjustment, implying, in some cases, a deeper 
economic downturn:  the implied promise is that future output will be higher.  They have, 
implicitly, used a spring model—the further the spring is pulled down, the stronger the 
restorative forces.  Yet critics suggest that there is a better analogy:  the economy is like a 
weak spring—pull it down too much, and it remains permanently distorted.  Restorative 
forces are destroyed.   While both are mere analogies—neither is based on a detailed 
modeling—statistical analysis suggests that the critics are closer to the mark:  the 
stochastic processes describing the economy exhibit close to unit roots, so that if the 
economy’s output is lowered 10% today, the best estimate is that, ten years from now, 
output will be 10% lower than it otherwise would have been.   
 
This example makes another important point:  many of the beliefs and assertions about 
macro-economic policies, especially by politicians, but even by central bankers, are based 
neither on well formulated theories or well researched evidence.  And part of the problem 
is that the complexity of economic systems often makes it difficult to provide clean tests 
of economic hypotheses.   
 
I shall divide the discussion below into two parts, which will cover much of the same 
material, but from two quite distinct vantage points.  The first approaches the issues from 
a policy  perspective, where I identify three broad positions, which I shall label the 
“conservative,” the “standard economics” and the “heterodox” approaches.  The 
conservative approach worries about inflation and deficits, which it attempts to address 
through tight monetary and fiscal policy, the standard economics approach about 
unemployment and stagnation, which it attempts to address through expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy; and the heterodox approach looks for non-standard ways—
including the use of micro-economic interventions—to stabilize the economy, to 
stimulate growth and employment and contain inflation. 
 
Three Perspectives on Policy 
 
The best way to see the difference between the alternative approaches is to look at how 
they might respond to an impending slowdown in the economy.5  As the economy goes 
into a downturn, government revenues decline, and some areas of expenditures increase, 
so that a balanced budget turns into a deficit.      
 
 
The Conventional Economics Approach 
 
The approach which has been conventional for more than a half century is that associated 
with Keynes:  increase government deficits, cut taxes, let the deficit increase further, and 
lower interest rates.  The increased spending and lower taxes stimulate the economy, as 
does the lower interest rates.  While there is some preference for looser monetary policy 
over looser fiscal policy—the former encourages growth in the short run, the latter may 
actually harm it--when the economy is in a severe economic downturn—or now, when 
there is large excess capacity--lowering interest rates may fail to stimulate investment, 
and reliance has to be placed on fiscal policy.   
 
Conservatives have critiqued the ability of fiscal policy to stimulate the economy on 
several grounds.  First, deficits lead to debt, taxpayers know that the debt will have to be 
repaid, and hence households will be forced to save more.  The net stimulation of the 
economy is small.  The failure of deficits to stimulate the Japanese economy has provided 
some support for this view.  This is known at the Barro-Ricardo hypothesis, and there is 
little general support for it either theoretically or empirically.  So long as tax cuts go to 
those who are credit constrained—and there is some evidence that particularly lower 
income individuals are credit constrained—then a tax cut will stimulate consumption.  
Moreover, the Japanese example is not compelling.  The question is, is there some form 
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of tax cut which would stimulate the economy, and even in Japan, the temporary cut of 
the consumption tax did seem to work.  A temporary cut in the income tax might not 
work, because individuals may not view their long run (permanent) income as 
substantially higher; and the government cannot credibly commit itself to a permanent 
reduction in an income tax, in the face of soaring deficits.  But a temporary cut in a 
consumption tax encourages consumption today—there is effectively a sale—and the 
assertion that it is temporary is credible.  (Even a temporary cut in the income tax may 
have effects, because the current generation may pass on the burden of the debt to future 
generations; their permanent income is higher, even if future generations’ income is 
lower.  The result that a temporary income tax cut has no effect is predicated on 
individual’s adjusting their bequests to make up for the increased public debt that will be 
bequeathed to future generations; since most individuals do not in fact leave bequests, it 
is implausible that these bequests fully offset the increased public indebtedness.) 
 
There are other tax cuts designed to increase investment of firms, e.g. a temporary 
investment tax credit, which lowers the relative price of investing today, relative to 
investing sometime in the future, thus encouraging investment today (at the expense of 
future investment). 
 
In recent years, attention has focused on the design of low cost stimuli, i.e. stimuli that 
provide a large bang for the buck.  The prototype is the incremental investment tax credit, 
which provides an investment tax credit only on increments in investment (e.g. about 
80% of last year’s investment.)  The incremental investment tax credit has the same 
effect at the margin of a full investment tax credit, but since most investment (the “base”) 
does not receive any credit, the cost to the government is markedly less.  (That, 
incidentally, was why businesses were distinctly uninterested in this idea.) 
 
Under a standard neoclassical investment function6, an incremental investment tax credit 
will be fully as effective as the standard investment tax cut7.  If, however, investment by 
firms is limited by their availability of cash (or even by their net worth), then the 
incremental investment tax credit will not be as effective as a full investment tax credit. 
 
The recognition of the importance of cash flow and credit constraints provides a variety 
of other stimuli which, particularly in the long run, have low budgetary costs.  For 
instance, the government may extend the period of loss carry forward or carry back 
(which in any case would increase economic efficiency8), and make the losses fully 
credible to the extent that firms engage in investment.  Alternatively, the government can 
provide credit to firms which are engaged in investment.  The ability of government to 
recover loans is greater than that of private lenders.   
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Cash flow constraints, combined with special institutional features of America’s 
mortgage markets, have also provided an explanation for some of the successes of 
monetary policy in the United States in the recent economic downturn.   As interest rates 
have fallen, households have refinanced their mortgages, taking out hundreds of billions 
of dollars, which have been used to sustain consumption.  Households have been able to 
do this because there is conventionally no pre-payment penalty (such penalties would 
mean that households would only refinance their mortgages when the fall in interest rates 
was quite substantial), and most mortgages are fixed rate mortgages.  To see the 
importance of these features, assume, to the contrary, that mortgages were only variable 
rate.  Then households would not pay any attention to the nominal rate, only to the real 
rate; one of the reasons for the decline in the nominal rate is the decline in the expected 
rate of inflation, and to the extent that is the case, the decline in the real rate is much 
smaller.  Moreover, if there are significant moving costs, then households will look not at 
today’s real rate, but at the expected real rate over the holding period, and this too may 
vary little with changes in the current real rate.9 
 
For developing countries, there is one further impediment to the reliance on fiscal policy:  
governments may find it difficult to borrow, to obtain the funds with which to finance 
their deficits.  One of the main reasons for the founding of the IMF was to help countries 
to finance expansionary deficits, recognizing these capital market imperfections, and 
recognizing the interdependence of the countries of the world, that a downturn in one 
country has an adverse effect on others. 
 
Keynesian economics, with its focus on employment, tends to look more favorably upon 
policies which result in lower exchange rates.  (Of course, in a global economic system, 
not all countries can lower their exchange rates against each other; but small developing 
countries are, in this respect at least, at an advantage.  They can choose an exchange rate 
policy without worrying about responses from the major economic players, though they 
still may have to worry about responses with more immediate economic rivals.)  Lower 
exchange rates facilitate exports and help import substitution industries.  In a full 
employment economy, they would thus simply reflect a movement of resources away 
from non-tradeables towards tradeables, but in an economy marked with unemployment 
of labor and other resources, the increase in demand for tradeables can result in an 
increase in demand for non-tradeables as well, as the increased income generated in the 
tradeable sector spills over to the non-tradeable sector.   
 
There are a variety of mechanisms by which government can affect the exchange rate.  
Most directly, a decrease in the interest rate may—if its direct positive effects on the 
economy do not reduce the probability of default on loans significantly—make it less 
attractive to put money into a country, and accordingly may lead to a lower exchange 
rate.10  In the short run, government may buy dollars (sell its local currency), and this 
intervention in the exchange rate too may lead to a lower exchange rate.  There may also 
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be micro-economic interventions, e.g. discouraging the inflow of short term capital 
(Chilean style taxes on capital inflows) designed to prevent an appreciation of the 
currency.   
 
As we note below, some of the most important stimuli to the economy have come 
through exchange rate changes.  Still, there are, in many quarters, worries about a weak 
exchange rate, and even more, about marked changes in the exchange rate.  These 
concerns are discussed below. 
 
The Conservative Approach.   
 
The Keynesian approach argued that even if government expenditures were directly 
totally unproductive, that they neither provided consumption nor investment benefits, 
there were large social returns from the expansion of output which they engendered.  If, 
of course, government spends money on high productivity investments—and estimates 
put the return on government expenditures in certain areas, like R & D, as far higher than 
marginal returns to investment in the private sector—then the social benefits of these 
government expenditures can be enormous.  Not only will output today be increased, but 
so will output tomorrow.  They will increase future growth, even as they increase today’s 
income.  China’s countercyclical expenditures in the East Asian crisis provide a case in 
point.  (Part of the reason for China’s success was that they were able to draw upon a set 
of investment plans that had already been largely prepared, but temporarily shelved for 
lack of funds.) 
 
Conservatives, worried about an expansion of the size of the public sector, begin with the 
presumption that government expenditures are not productive (either as investments or 
consumption), and attempt to argue that they also fail to stimulate economic activity.  
There is one strand to the conservative agenda, popular in academic circles, but less so 
beyond, which argues that there is no need for stabilization policy, that the economy is 
always at full employment, that variations in observed levels of employment are largely a 
reflection of voluntary decisions on the part of workers, who because of the particular 
configuration of relative prices (wages, interest rates) choose, at particular times—like 
1929 to 1933, during the Great Depression—to markedly decrease their labor supply.  
Normally, of course, workers who would have chosen leisure over work, who have 
decided to take a protracted vacation, might be thought to be happy to be relieved of the 
burdens of such ordinary toils; accordingly, to the conservatives who believe that these 
workers have chosen not to work, the mystery of their profound unhappiness is more a 
matter to be dealt with by psychologists than by economists. 
 
At the heart of the conservative approach is the contention that expanding government 
expenditures is likely not only to be ineffective, but actually may be counterproductive.  
Of course, if expanding government expenditures is counterproductive, there is an 
obvious conclusion:  contract government expenditures.  Conservatives are more divided 
on the question of taxes, and the answer may seemingly depend on circumstances.  Some 
(like President Bush) argue that reducing taxes in an economic downturn is a good thing, 
using Keynesian like arguments, though the more conventional conservative approach 
(reflected in say IMF’s stance in Argentina and East Asia) is that raising taxes is 
desirable, because it reduces the deficit.  While Keynes argued that increasing deficits 
stimulates the economy, the conservatives argue that reducing deficits stimulates the 
economy.   
 
There is one strand of the conservative agenda that, while recognizing that government 
actions might stimulate the economy, emphasizes the temporary nature of market 
disequilibria, of unemployment, and the slowness of government and of market responses 
to government actions, so that by the time the government recognizes a macro-economic 
problem and takes action, the economy is already on the way to recovery.  The 
government action is, accordingly, more likely to lead to an overheating of the economy 
in the rebound.  In this view, then, the government should simply accept whatever 
fluctuations the economy suffers:  attempts to improve matters are likely to be 
counterproductive.  Even those who hold this view, however, cannot argue against the 
desirability of designing automatic stabilizers, which change the “risk” properties of the 
economy, so that output and employment are less responsive to shocks.  We take up the 
design of such stabilizers in Part II.   
 
Moreover, the lags associated with different kinds of government actions differ markedly.   
An increase in unemployment benefits or assistance to states that otherwise would have 
been forced to cut back their expenditures can have a large and almost immediate effect.  
The fact that the economy may recover of its own accord within, say, a year, may limit 
the desirability of taking actions where the lag in effect is greater than a year, it says little 
about the desirability of taking actions with shorter lags. 
 
The conservative “mainstream” however argues either that government actions are likely 
to be ineffective, or counterproductive.  The essential argument is that increased 
government expenditures (say, keeping taxes constant, so that deficits increase) 
discourages other forms of aggregate demand, so that total aggregate demand remains 
unchanged or is decreased.  Conversely, reducing government expenditures encourages 
other forms of aggregate demand.   
 
The most popular version of this argument invokes the hard-to-verify notion of 
confidence.  Investors, seeing soaring deficits, lose confidence in the economy, decide not 
to invest, and this brings down the economy; resolute government action to counter the 
deficit, by lowering government expenditures, increases investment, and quickly restores 
the economy to health.  The counter argument is that investors look at a range of 
variables, including the economy’s unemployment rate and growth rate; and the impact 
effect of the reduction of government expenditures is to decrease growth and increase 
unemployment, and that this direct effect normally overwhelms the effect on confidence 
of deficit reduction.  This is especially the case because the reduction in GDP itself 
reduces tax revenues, so that the impact of the reduction of government expenditures on 
the deficit is smaller, sometimes markedly smaller, than it would be if GDP had remained 
constant. 
 
Remarkably, in spite of the frequency with which the confidence argument is invoked, 
there is little empirical research on the matter (including by the IMF, which seems to rely 
on it so heavily).  The overwhelming weight of evidence, however, for developed 
countries is that contractions of government expenditures lead to a lowering of GDP—the 
confidence effect is dominated by the direct impact effect.  The effects in developing 
countries are complicated by limitations of the availability of finance, an issue to which 
we turn shortly.  But even in developing countries, expenditure reductions forced on 
Argentina and the East Asian countries did not have the positive effects promised by the 
IMF, but rather had the negative effects predicted by the more standard models. 
 
The only major recent circumstance in which deficit reduction (contraction of 
government expenditure) has been associated with recovery is the 1993 deficit reduction 
and recovery in the U.S.  The standard story put forward, however, is intellectually 
incoherent.  Deficit reduction, it is said, led to a reduction in long term interest rates, 
which stimulated investment, more than offsetting the direct impact of the reduced 
government expenditures.  But if, as alleged, investment expenditures are highly interest 
elastic, then the central bank (Fed) could have directly lowered long term interest rates 
(e.g. by open market operations involving long term bonds).  Thus, deficit reduction was 
not necessary to achieve recovery.  To be sure, the fine tuning of the structure of deficit 
reduction was important:  relatively little immediate expenditure cuts meant that the 
impact effects were small, while the longer term commitment to deficit reduction meant 
significant reductions in long term interest rates.  (Ironically, the Bush conservatives are 
now claiming that deficits have little impact on interest rates, and there is a large 
literature suggesting that interest rates have limited effects on investment. If those 
conservative arguments have validity, it reinforces the conclusion that if the 1993 deficit 
reduction contributed to recovery, it must have been through some other mechanism.) 
 
The 1993 argument for why deficit reduction worked is closely related to a standard 
argument for why increased government expenditures will not work:  government 
borrowing to finance expenditures increases the interest rate, which crowds out private 
investment.  In a full employment economy, crowding out arguments are persuasive:  an 
increase in expenditures in any category must come at the expense of decreased 
expenditures in other categories.  But on a priori grounds, when the economy is below 
full employment, there is no necessity of crowding out.  Increased government 
expenditures might stimulate the economy so much that there is even room for more 
investment, not less.  Clearly, if investment is interest elastic, and the central bank can act 
to prevent a rise in interest rates, then there is no necessity of crowding out; and 
presumably, the improved economic situation (including strengthened cash flows) should 
lead to more investment.   
 
There is a more subtle argument, noted earlier, that taxpayers, recognizing that the higher 
deficit will be associated with higher taxes in the future, reduce their consumption.   (In 
this case, it is as if government expenditures crowds out private consumption.)  But, as 
we noted, that conclusion has little empirical support11, and will not be true if there are 
credit and cash flow constraints and/or redistributive effects. 
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There is a slight variant of these crowding out arguments for a small open economy, 
captured by the basic identity 
 
Bf = M – X = I – Sg – Sp  
 
Net borrowing abroad (Bf) equals imports minus exports, and equals the gap between 
domestic investment and domestic savings, which in turn consists of government savings 
and private savings.  As an extreme case, assume a perfect global capital market, and that 
investment and private savings are just dependent on the global interest rate.  Then an 
increase in government expenditures, reducing government savings, is accompanied by 
an increase in foreign borrowing, which in turn is associated with an increase in net 
imports, so that 
       G + X – M 
remains unchanged, i.e. there is no change in aggregate demand.  But the assumptions 
underlying this model are very stringent.  In particular, for instance, there is no 
uncertainty about changes in the exchange rate; more generally, even if savings and 
investment are functions of interest rates, they will depend both on the international rate, 
and the “domestic” rate, which is set by the monetary authorities.12  Moreover, domestic 
investment depends on credit availability and cash flows, not just on interest rates.     
 
The conservative policy approach is both more pessimistic about the efficacy of fiscal 
policy and of monetary policy.  Correspondingly, it is more worried about inflation than 
unemployment . Looser monetary policy, it is worried, will result not in more output, but 
simply in higher prices.  While at various times, conservatives have put forth different 
reasons for coming to that conclusion—with the classical dichotomy, real variables were 
determined by the “reals,” and the money supplied simply determined the price level; 
with the new classicals, there was a vertical Phillips curve, so that attempts to change the 
unemployment level were futile—underlying these is the belief that the economy 
functions well, so that the economy is as close to full employment as can be obtained, 
given the inevitable frictions in the economy.   
 
(Today, while the concept of the long run vertical Phillips curve remains debated13, it 
seems clear that the government can affect the level of output and unemployment in the 
short run.14  The models in which monetary policy has no effect are highly special, e.g. 
assuming risk neutrality on the part of all agents.  Of course, if output were really 
unaffected by monetary policy, there would be little concern about inflation, since it 
would not have any adverse effect on output and employment.)   
 
The conservative approach to macro-economic stabilization policy sees low interest rates 
directly leading to a risk of inflation, or through a risk of excess demand, but also through 
a depreciation of the currency and a decreased supply of external resources.  Depreciation 
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of currency leads to higher prices of imports, and this can be passed on through the 
economic system, leading to an inflationary spiral.  Indeed, they see a real risk that 
attempts at currency depreciation will be self-defeating:  as prices rise, there will be no 
lowering of the real exchange rate.  The evidence, however, is that at least in the short 
term—the focus of stabilization policy—the government can successfully lower the real 
exchange rate; and as we comment below, there is no necessity that such lowering of the 
exchange rate lead to an inflationary spiral, as evidenced by the marked decreases in 
exchange rate in East Asia.  
 
By the same token, higher exchange rates will be associated with a lower level of demand 
for exports and import substitutes and a higher level of capital inflows; with less demand 
on the country’s output, and a greater availability of resources, presumably there will be 
less inflationary pressures—unless the increased capital flows lead to greater credit 
availability and higher levels of investment, more than offsetting the reduced demand for 
exports and increased supply of resources.  In the standard models, in which investment 
depends simply on the real interest rate, or the real interest rate and the exchange rate, 
investment is likely, if anything, to be reduced (though the effect may depend on the 
relative sensitivity of investment in the non-tradeable and tradeable sectors to the 
exchange rate.)  In practice, the effect depends on a host of factors not incorporated into 
the standard models.     
 
The heterodox Approach 
 
The standard Keynesian approaches emphasized aggregate demand, with consumption 
depending on current income, and investment depending on interest rates.  As macro-
economics evolved, greater emphasis was placed on the intertemporal context in which 
consumption and investment decisions were made.  It was lifetime income (or permanent 
income) which mattered, so that temporary income tax cuts would have little effect, 
though temporary sales taxes presumably would (the magnitude of the effect depending 
on the extent of intertemporal substitution.)  Lifetime (or permanent) income in turn 
depended on expectations, because individuals could not today sell forward labor 
services, nor could they buy insurance against variations in the real wages they might 
receive.  Investment too depended on expectations, concerning future prices and 
demands.15 
 
One important strand in what I shall broadly call the heterodox approach focuses on how 
government policy might affect those expectations.  Particularly important in this area are 
attempts to affect inflationary expectations.  If, for instance, a currency devaluation is 
expected to bring about a fully offsetting increase in domestic prices, then no real 
devaluation will be expected, and hence investments in export industries will not 
increase.   There may be a short term blip in exports, but it will not be sustained.  If, 
however, the government credibly announces an inflation targeted monetary policy16, 
then investors may believe that real exchange rate decrease may be longer lasting, and be 
willing to increase investments in the export sector.  There appears, however, a high 
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degree of instability to the process of expectation formation, with market participants 
seemingly placing heavy weight on recent experiences.   For instance, recent large 
devaluations have not given rise to inflationary spirals, and in some cases, there has been 
relatively little inflation, and accordingly, market participants seem to respond to 
currency depreciations with less inflationary expectations. 
 
Other important strands have emphasized not only demand side effects, but also supply 
side effects,  not only expectations, but also constraints, including cash flow and credit 
constraints, and a broader range of  balance sheet effects.  Most of the standard models 
assume competitive markets, but with competitive markets, a small open economy should 
never face an aggregate demand problem:  an appropriate change in the exchange rate 
would lead it to face a horizontal demand curve.  Fluctuations in output must, 
accordingly, be based in fluctuations in aggregate supply, not aggregate demand.  The 
theory of the risk averse, credit constrained firm provides micro-foundations for such 
variability in supply:  For instance, a firm that cannot get access to working capital will 
contract its supply.  Since firms cannot divest themselves of risk (there are imperfect 
equity markets17) and since most production involves risk bearing—firms have to put out 
money for inputs before they sell their output—variations in the ability and willingness to 
bear risk, for instance, as a result of a change in the firm’s balance sheet, will result in 
variations the firm’s supply curve.  A shock to aggregate demand in one period will affect 
profitability, and hence the firm’s balance sheet—and hence aggregate supply in 
subsequent periods.  Demand and supply are intertwined. 
 
Stabilization policy needs to take these effects into account.  When this is done, it 
suggests that some policies are less effective than they might otherwise seem, while 
others may be more effective.  Most importantly, it identifies different conditions under 
which policies may have different effects.  Consider, for instance, the effect of a large 
increase in the interest rate, recommended by the IMF in the context of the East Asia (and 
other currency) crisis, as a way of limiting the depreciation of the exchange rate.  The 
large increase in the interest rates had the usual effects of depressing investment (and thus 
contributing to the economic downturn) and long term asset values (including, for 
instance, real estate).  In many cases, firms were unable to meet their debt obligations, 
and the recognition that not all firms could be forced into bankruptcy meant that some 
firms decided strategically not to repay what they owed.  Banks in turn could not make 
loans, especially when pressure was put on them to set aside reserves and quickly to 
come into compliance with capital adequacy standards.  The economic downturn 
contributed to a general sense of uncertainty and risk; and the fact that different firms had 
asset structures that were differentially affected by the large changes in asset prices meant 
that there was increased uncertainty about the value of balance sheets.  The result was 
that the response of exports to the currency depreciation was much less than expected:  
exporting firms could not obtain the working capital they required; for this reason, and 
because of balance sheet effects combined with risk aversion, there was an adverse shift 
in supply curves.  Moreover, importers recognized that because of the increased 
likelihood of bankruptcy of the exporters (or of bankruptcy of the suppliers to exporters), 
                                                 
17 The imperfections can be explained through models of asymmetric information. 
the exporting firms had become more unreliable suppliers, so that there was an adverse 
shift in the demand curve.   
 
One of the arguments for high interest rates was that it would attract capital into the 
country, which would help stabilize the exchange rate.  But the deepening economic 
recession caused by the increased interest rates, and the broader increased uncertainty 
noted earlier, meant that risk averse investors found it less attractive to put money into 
the country, or at least mitigated the increased attractiveness of the increase in interest 
rates by itself.   
 
By the same token, the effects of a currency depreciation depend critically on the 
circumstances of the country.  If a country is a net debtor (in foreign denominated terms), 
then on average, the country will be worse off; and the worsening balance sheets will 
depress consumption and investment.  If a country is a net creditor, it is better off on 
average.  But even if it is a net creditor, some firms within the economy will be net 
debtors, and the economic consequences of their losses may more than offset the benefits 
of those who are better off.  Thus, the impact of a currency depreciation will depend 
critically on an assessment of the balance sheets of the agents (firms, households, 
government) within the economy.  Japan is a net creditor; Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia 
were net debtors.  In Malaysia, most of the firms and banks had limited exposure. In 
Thailand, the firms that were most heavily exposed were the real estate firms, and the 
banks that had lent to them; these were already bankrupt, so that further depreciation 
would have little marginal effect; the other major group of heavily indebted firms were 
exporters, and they often gained more from the increased Baht value of their exports than 
they lost from the increased baht value of their dollar denominated debt. 
 
Depreciations have an adverse effect on producers of non-traded goods that rely on 
imported intermediate goods, and, especially when there are credit constraints, the 
adverse effect on their production may occur prior to the positive effect on exports, in 
which case the impact effect of a depreciation may be negative, contrary to what the 
simple macro-models would suggest.   
 
While this analysis cautions against large changes in interest rates (of the kind that the 
IMF has often recommended), it also suggests a variety of other instruments for helping 
stabilize the economy.  For instance, extended loss carry-forward and carry back 
provisions enhance the sharing of risk between firms and government.  If cash flow 
constraints are important, an incremental investment tax credit may not be as effective in 
stimulating investment as a standard investment tax credit, and an exclusion of dividends 
from taxation may encourage the distribution of earnings, and adversely affect 
investment.   
 
A particularly and increasingly important strand of work focuses of debt deflation:  when 
the economy goes into a downturn, and there is deflation (or inflation is less than 
expected), the redistributive consequences (between debtors and creditors) can be very 
large, and lead to significant effects on both demand and supply.  While recent 
experiences in Japan have called attention to this possibility, there have been important 
earlier episodes of deflation, and the heterodox models, focusing on balance sheet, cash 
flow, and credit constraints have provided a theoretical framework within which the 
effects of deflation can be examined.18 
 
.                                                                                   
Risk Analysis 
 
The economy can be viewed as a complex, dynamic system, buffeted by a variety of 
shocks.  Stabilization policy, broadly defined, attempts to (a) limit the shocks; (b) 
enhance the capacity to cope with the shocks, and in particular, dampen their effects; and 
(c) identify circumstances in which discretionary interventions might help stabilize the 
economy.  Modern risk analysis focuses on the interrelations among variables (e.g. their 
correlations), and takes a portfolio approach to interventions, recognizing that there is 
uncertainty associated with the impacts of any particular instrument, and that accordingly 
risk can be reduced by relying on a multitude of interventions.19 
 
Many economic reforms in recent years, whatever their other merits, have in fact 
increased developing countries’ exposure to shocks.  Most notable in this respect is 
capital market liberalization, which has subjected developing countries to the whims of 
international capital markets, and of speculators in particular; but the move from quotas 
to tarrification has also made countries more subject to commodity price shocks.  While 
in principle, greater openness, e.g. to international capital markets, opens up the 
possibility of additional mechanisms for buffering an economy, e.g. by countercyclical 
borrowing from abroad, in practice, such capital flows have been highly procyclical.  
 
Many of the “shocks” facing market economies are endogenous, the result of asset 
market bubbles which inevitably break.20  Such bubbles, the financial market crises to 
which they give rise, and financial crises more generally, are particularly associated with 
financial market, capital market, and other forms of liberalization.21  Liberalizations are 
often associated with a race to become the dominant player in a market (in the belief that 
competition in the market will not suffice to eliminate profits, generating strong 
competition for the market), and such races are often, in turn, associated with the 
construction of excess capacity—evidenced most recently by the telecom boom and bust 
in the United States.22     
 
                                                 
18 See, in particular, Fisher [    ], and the revival of Fisher’s debt-deflation analysis by Greenwald and 
Stiglitz [      ] 
19 See, e.g.  Greenwald and Stiglitz [    ] and, in the area of financial market regulation,  Stiglitz [    ] and 
Honohan and Stiglitz (other references) 
20 To some extent, asset market bubbles can be related to one of the market failures to be described below:  
the absence of future markets extending infinitely far into the future.  In the absence of such futures 
markets, the differential equations describing short run market equilibrium (the equality of returns, 
inclusive of capital gains) can be satisfied along a dynamic path in which such bubbles can appear.  See, for 
instance, Hahn [1966] and Shell and Stiglitz [1967]. 
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22 Again, this problem can also be related to the market failure of the absence of futures markets, which 
results in an investment coordination problem.   
Some reforms, e.g. the reduction of progressivity of taxation, as greater reliance is placed 
on a V.A.T. with fewer progressive exemptions have weakened the role of automatic tax 
stabilizers, while weaker safety nets (unemployment insurance) have weakened automatic 
expenditure stabilizers.  Still other “reforms” have introduced built-in destabilizers:  
strong capital adequacy requirements without forbearance imply that when an economy 
goes into a downturn, there may have to be a contraction of credit, since the bank cannot 
find alternative sources of finance (at “reasonable” terms.) 
 
Still other reforms may have strong effects, depending on the circumstance.  In particular, 
certain reforms, like individual pension (defined contribution) accounts, transfer risk 
from the corporation to households.  While such a risk transfer (from those more able to 
bear risk to those less able) is almost surely welfare reducing, it may also be 
destabilizing, since in the event of a downturn in stock market prices, households will 
respond more strongly, cutting back consumption, than would firms (whose actions are 
more directly related to cash flows, credit availability, and net worth.)   
 
Greater labor market flexibility, similarly, may lead to greater volatility, since such 
flexibility will be reflected in greater income volatility of workers, who respond by 
cutting back their consumption in a downturn.  The increased profitability of firms in a 
downturn may help buoy investment, but to the extent that investment is determined by 
future expectations, it may not.   
 
Developments in financial markets which enable the transfer of risk from those less able 
to bear it to those more able should, at the same time, be conducive to stability.  Rich 
individuals, for instance, can smooth consumption over their lifetime, so that were they to 
provide wage insurance for poorer individuals, who are more likely to be credit 
constrained, it would enhance stability.  On the other hand, deregulation of financial 
markets, which results in banks undertaking greater risks, and as a result, an increased 
probability of financial collapse, enhances economic instability.   
 
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz [2000, 2001] have attempted to ascertain, using standard 
cross country methodology, the factors which contribute to increased economic 
stability/volatility.  It appears that greater wage flexibility is associated with greater 
instability. 
 
The effects of financial depth appear to be more ambiguous, presumably because when 
financial depth is associated with better functioning capital markets, it allows smoothing 
of consumption and investment (reducing the impact of credit constraints, which have 
accelerator like effects), but when financial markets are deep but not well regulated, they 
can give rise to greater instability, as in the case of East Asia.   
 
Risk and discretion 
 
If the economy were described by stationary stochastic processes, and those processes 
were well understood, then presumably one could design rules which would specify how 
various “actions” (expenditures, taxes, etc.) would respond to different observations.  
There would be no reason not to make all actions automatic, and the only stabilizers 
would, accordingly, be automatic stabilizers.  To be sure, the extent of such automatic 
stabilizers might be far greater and the design of such stabilizers might be far more 
complicated than in standard models (for instance, they might depend not only on levels, 
but on rates of changes, and changes in the rates of change.)  Stabilization would be 
viewed as a standard “control problem,” albeit a complicated one.   
 
However, there is every reason to believe that the economy is not well described by a 
stationary stochastic process.  There are complicated changes in the structure of the 
economy, the impacts of which have to be evaluated and assessed:    Has the NAIRU, the 
level of unemployment below which inflation increases, fallen, and if so, by how much?  
Is the “New Economy” real, and if so, what is the increase in the economy’s potential 
growth rate?  Judgments have to be made, informed by past experience, but the 





Risk and Policy 
 
These changing structures of the economy—combined with that, even if the structure 
were not changing rapidly, our knowledge is still likely to be imperfect—means that we 
cannot be sure of the consequences of any policy.  There is always risk.  A seeming 
economic downturn may be less serious that current indicators suggest, implying that 
expansionary fiscal policy might lead to inflation.  Alternatively, the NAIRU may have 
fallen, meaning that there is more room for expansionary fiscal policy; not taking 
advantage of this unnecessarily condemns resources to idleness.   
 
Any stabilization policy must, accordingly, be subject to a risk assessment, ascertaining 
the risks associated with alternative policies and who bears those risks.  A risk 
assessment has to take into account option values—how a particular action affects the 
ability to take future actions as more information becomes available—and 
irreversibilities, how costly it may be to reverse adverse effects.  For instance, as the U.S. 
economy began to recover from the 1990-1991 recession, by early 1994 there were 
worries that it might become overheated.  Standard econometric models suggested the 
NAIRU was around 6.0 to 6.2%, but alternative models, focusing on changes in the labor 
market, had suggested a marked reduction in the NAIRU.  
 
Those who argued for “stepping on the brakes” argued that (i) the costs of inflation were 
high; (ii) once inflation started, it would likely increase—the economy was on a finely 
balanced precipice of low inflation, and could easily be disturbed; and (iii) the costs of 
disinflation were high.  Econometric studies conducted by the Council of Economic 
Advisers questioned each of the three premises:  at low levels of inflation, there appeared 
to be little if any adverse effect on growth; the stochastic processes describing inflation 
showed mean reversion, rather than a tendency to “explode”; and the costs of disinflation 
were not significant—the relationship between unemployment and the change in the 
inflation rate was either linear (meaning that the costs incurred in disinflation were 
exactly balanced by the gains experienced in the inflationary period; with discounting, 
the disinflationary costs were in fact lower) or convex (meaning that the costs of 
disinflation were smaller than the gains).  Moreover, those who argued for a policy of 
cautious expansion emphasized that inflation was not an end in itself, and one had to 
focus on the distributive, social, and dynamic benefits from expansion:  expansion would 
bring into the labor market those who had previously been excluded, and accordingly 
would be of enormous benefit to the poor; the social benefits would exceed the gains in 
income,   and should include the predicted declines in violence and crime; and that as 
more individuals were brought into the labor market, the NAIRU itself might be reduced, 
as individuals who are brought into the labor market become more adept at job search 
(the reverse of the hysteresis effects noted in Europe during its period of high 
unemployment23.)  A risk assessment thus strongly suggested that even if one thought 
that the NAIRU was, say, 6.0%, it would be worthwhile pushing the economy a little 
further. 
 
Another example where risk assessment seems desirable, but often does not occur, is in 
the arena of debt management.  Russia, in the period immediately before the Ruble crisis 
in August 1998 provides a case in point.  Government bonds denominated in rubles were 
paying far higher interest rates than were dollar denominated bonds.  These too paid a 
high interest rate, reflecting default risk.  But the interest rate on ruble denominated 
bonds reflected the additional exchange rate risk.  If one believed that markets were well 
informed and risk neutral, the difference between the two interest rates represents the 
expectation of a devaluation.  A prudent government borrowing in dollars would have set 
aside a reserve fund to reflect the expected extra costs upon the event of the devaluation.  
But the IMF, focusing on the short run budgetary advantages of borrowing in hard 
currency, and ignoring the desirability of setting aside a reserve—which might admittedly 
have made matters worse, but suggesting a lack of commitment to the current exchange 
rate-- encouraged Russia to borrow in dollars.  While this lowered slightly (analysis at the 
World Bank suggested negligibly, since the likelihood that the exchange rate could be 
sustained in any case was nil) the probability of a crisis, it markedly increased the adverse 
consequences of a devaluation, should it occur.  It meant that the gains from exports and 
import substitution would be largely offset by the adverse effects on the country’s 
balance sheet, making it more difficult for it to emerge from the deep depression into 
which he had sunk.  It accordingly meant that there was a higher likelihood that the 
country would have to default on its loans (should the crisis occur in the near term24) 
What should have been clear was that the decision to encourage Russia to move into hard 
currency bonds had significant risk implications; but these implications were given scant 




                                                 
23 reference 
24 The high interest rates on GKO and the resulting increased indebtedness suggested that, if the crisis did 
not occur for some time into the future, it is possible that long term default probabilities might have 
increased. 
Macro policy is often guided by a focus on intermediate variables (like inflation) and 
accounting frameworks (budget deficits, measures of output.)  The link between these 
“signals” and the real variables which are of concern is both tenuous and controversial.   
 
Budget deficits numbers serve several purposes.  They are supposed to provide at the 
same time an indicator of inflationary pressure, a measure of government borrowing 
requirements, and a signal concerning government’s balance sheet position.  Ideally, 
there might be separate accounting frameworks oriented around each of these.  As it is, 
the accounting frameworks used by most governments are a mélange, providing 
unreliable indicators with respect to any of the variables of interest.   
 
For instance, if the government kept a capital account, one could measure increases in 
assets and liabilities.  Borrowing for current consumption should be treated differently 
from borrowing for investment.  There are, however, well known difficulties in 
differentiating between true investments and consumption expenditures, with 
governments attempting to claim tat most expenditures are really investments in the 
future.   
 
By the same token, the sale of national assets (privatizations) is often treated as revenues, 
even though, if the proceeds are spent on consumption, the country is poorer.  Of course, 
government borrowing requirements are reduced.   
 
The most egregious example of inappropriate accounting frameworks has entailed the 
long standing discussion between the World Bank and the IMF over the treatment of 
foreign aid, exemplified by the dispute in Ethiopia in 1997, a country which at the time 
had exhibited robust growth for more than five years, no inflation, and, according to the 
World Bank, budget balance, but according to the IMF, a large budget deficit.  The 
dispute revolves around the treatment of foreign aid, which the Fund insisted not be 
included in the budget, because such revenues could not be counted upon.  In fact, 
analyses at the World Bank showed that they were less volatile than tax revenues.  The 
appropriate response, of course, was that offered by the Ethiopian government:  if 
revenues are highly variable, expenditures have to be highly flexible; and their 
expenditure programs had a high degree of built in flexibility, with village schools and 
health clinics, for instance, only being constructed as revenues were received.25   
 
To take another example, government expenditures to recapitalize the banking system are 
often treated just like ordinary expenditures, though such expenditures do not directly 
increase aggregate demand; they have an impact on aggregate demand only to the extent 
that the bank expands its credit supply—but such impacts would be no different from any 
other monetary expansion.  Sometimes, it is argued that the interest on such government 
expenditures should be included in the deficit, though not the principle.  The underlying 
principle, however, is not clear.   Again, it depends on what information the budget 
deficit is supposed to convey.  If it is suppose to convey information about impacts on 
aggregate demand, then it depends to whom the interest is paid.   Traditionally, interest is 
treated as if it were a transfer payment, with the impact on aggregate demand depending 
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on the marginal propensity to consume of the recipients.  If the interest is paid to 
domestic lenders, then it presumably would add to aggregate demand, much as any other 
source of income would; but if it is paid to foreigners, then the impact on domestic 
aggregate demand would be negligible. If it is supposed to convey information about 
government borrowing requirements, then it depends critically how government plans to 
raise funds.  In some cases, government can recapitalize the banking system by 
borrowing from the banks themselves, or issuing bonds which are held by the bank; in 
either case, there is no impact on the remainder of the market (other than through the 
government’s overall credit rating, and since such bank recapitalization often entails little 
more than converting a contingent liability into a slightly more explicit liability, even that 
is likely to be little affected.)  Recognizing this, the interest rate paid on such borrowing 
or bonds can be negligible.   
 
Most accounting frameworks do not take into account contingent liabilities, though not 
doing so provides strong incentives for budget chicanery.  Governments can lend money, 
knowing that it will not be repaid, and such loans are not treated as expenditures, at least 
in the year in which they are made.  (The United States, since the Credit Reform Act of 
19xx has required an actual estimate of the losses from any loan be added to expenditures 
in the year in which the loan is made.)   
 
The IMF has long treated borrowing by government owned corporations in Latin 
America differently from that of government owned corporations in Europe.  In the 
former case, there is a consolidated balance sheet, with such borrowing treated as if it 
were an increase to the government deficit; in the latter case, the borrowing is not 
consolidated.   
 
Some policy reforms have worsened the government’s apparent budgetary position, while 
at the same time actually improving it, and have provided otherwise misleading 
information about the state of the economy.  Consider, in particular, the privatization of 
social security which has occurred in many Latin American countries.  The privatizations 
have redirected the inflows of funds from the government into private accounts.  
Accordingly, the government’s budget often looks worse, as it continues to pay for 
current retirees, albeit sometimes even these benefits may have been cut back.  The 
privatization has reduced the accumulation of contingent liabilities, but since these 
contingent liabilities do not appear on the books, these gains are no where evident.  The 
increased apparent deficit leads some to mistakenly conclude that there are inflationary 
pressures from the budget; but in terms of anything real nothing much has happened:  
individuals disposable incomes remain unchanged, since they are forced to send to the 
private social security accounts what they formerly sent to the public social security 
accounts.  Government “saving” is down, but private saving is up by an exactly 
corresponding amount.  Indeed, if the government borrows from the private social 
security accounts, it is doing what it was implicitly doing before (borrowing from the 
public social security accounts).  The taming of expectations concerning future benefits 
brought about by privatization might actually lead to more private savings and reduced 
consumption.  The magnitude of these effects is large:  had Argentina, for instance, not 
privatized its social security system, it is estimated that it would, even at the time of the 
crisis, have had no budgetary deficit.  It was entirely due to the privatization.    
 
Measures of output—typically taken as a key measure of the success of economic 
policy—suffer from similar problems.  A country should be interested in the welfare of 
its citizens, which is reflected more in GNP statistics than in GDP.  GDP could go up, 
even as the citizens of the country become poorer as they sell off to foreigners national 
assets.  Still better are measures of national output that take into account depreciation of 
capital, depletion of natural resources, the degradation of the environment, and the 
assumption of risks, e.g. with short term foreign borrowing.   
 
Political Economy:  Institutions and Institutional constraints 
 
If government has the power to affect the level of economic activity to stabilize the level 
of economic activity, it must also have the power to destabilize it.  Viewing the 
government as an independent actor within the economy, with its own incentives, 
provided by the political process, whether it stabilizes or destabilizes it depends then on 
the incentives it faces.  In democracies, the incentives the government confronts depends 
on the voting behavior of the citizens.  An earlier literature26 depicted voters as myopic, 
willing to be beguiled by robust growth in the months leading up to an election, to be 
inevitably followed by inflation, contraction, a downturn.  Only by delegating the 
responsibility for macro-economic management—and in particular for monetary policy—
to a body somewhat removed from the political process can macro-economic stability be 
achieved, in the view of those who see politics at the root of macro-economic instability.  
Critics, though, see this institutional arrangement as entailing a high price in terms of 
democratic governance—there are few issues which are of more importance to citizens 
than the quality of macro-economic management; election regressions show that as the 
major determining factor in electoral success; yet with delegation, the government is 
being held accountable for that which it is not responsible.  Moreover, as we have argued, 
issues of macro-economic management entail trade-offs, necessarily involving political 
decisions, decisions that cannot be devolved to technocrats.  While there has been 
considerable discussion of the desirability of independent central banks, there has been 
much less discussion of the importance of representativeness, and the two concepts are 
distinct.   
 
To justify the delegation of political responsibility to technocrats, the mandate of the 
central bank has been narrowed, to fighting inflation.  More sensitive democratic 
governments have argued that the level of the inflation target should be said by the 
government, for it is that that involves the trade-offs referred to earlier.  But still, there 
are risks associated with missing the “target,” with different groups bearing the costs of 
those risks, so that even a government specified inflation target does not depoliticize the 
conduct of monetary policy.27  
                                                 
26 Nordhaus [    ], Frey [    ] 
27 To be sure, one could imagine a process in which information about the state of the economy is 
continually being conveyed from the Central Bank to the government, who conveys to the Central Bank not 
 
While there is some evidence that independent central banks with an inflation target do 
achieve lower levels of inflation—it would be striking if they failed to do so—inflation, 
as noted earlier, is only an intermediate variable, and the question is, do the economies 
with such institutional structures achieve better performance in real terms, e.g. growth, 
unemployment, poverty, equality, or even the short term trade-off between 
unemployment and (change in the rate of) inflation, the sacrifice ratio.  The evidence 
does not suggest that they do.28 
 
Indeed, simple theoretical models suggest that with shifting demand and supply curves, 
an attempt to stabilize prices may well lead to the destabilization of output; price 
adjustments are meant to buffer quantity adjustments, and by reducing the scope for such 
price adjustments, one places more of the burden on quantity adjustments. 
 
Institutional arrangements, however, can embed commitments which might not otherwise 
be enforceable (problems of dynamic consistency), and can thereby be welfare 





The preceding discussion took as its point of departure recent policy debates, informed by 
advances in economic theory.  There has been a parallel discussion, focusing on the ways 
that actual market economies differ from the benchmark, the competitive equilibrium 
model in which all markets (including the market for labor) clear.  While older 
stabilization theories were developed on the basis of models of the business cycle—
difference and differential equations that yielded oscillations of regular periodicity—
there is increasing evidence against such fluctuations30; and indeed, if there were such 
periodicity and if government policies were effect, they should presumably act to 
countervail:  if every six years, the economy goes into a recession, then monetary 
authorities should engage in strong monetary expansion, say five years after the last 
trough.  But while there are not regular cycles, the economy is subject to enormous 
fluctuations.  There are a myriad of shocks; and although many of these are offsetting—
the demand for products in one industry go up, in another go down—a few are of such a 
nature as to have macro-economic consequences.   
 
While recent macro-economic modeling has often centered on models in which 
deviations from the standard competitive model are limited—wages and prices are, for 
instance, fully flexible, and while there may not be a complete set of markets, individuals 
behave as if there were, with rational expectations concerning wages and prices, for 
                                                                                                                                                 
only an inflation target, but a Bayesian loss function, which the Central Bank is instructed to implement.  It 
is hard to describe such close interaction as full delegation.  
28 references 
29 More precisely, they affect transactions costs associated with certain changes in courses of actions, 
making those choices less likely. 
30 reference 
instance, extending infinitely far into the future.  More broadly, there are no problems of 
information imperfections or asymmetries, and if markets are imperfect, intelligent 
market participants have found ways of dealing with these limitations, e.g. through 
complicated contracting provisions, so again the consequences of these market 
imperfections are limited.  Such modeling approaches, whatever their merits, provide 
little insights into the key stabilization problems facing developing countries; 
unfortunately, some of the policy stances are derived from such models, or slight 
perturbations of such models—or even worse, are based on incoherent modeling.  For 
instance, during the East Asia crisis, those who argued that raising interest rates would 
attract more capital did so on the basis of models which assumed no default (to the extent 
that the reasoning was based on models); yet it was the fear of default which had 
motivated banks and other creditors to refuse to roll over their loans.  Macroeconomic 
policy emphasized the role bad lending practices, but in the formal models, the financial 
sector was virtually limited to a simplified money demand equation.  The analyses 
ignored credit rationing, yet credit rationing frequently arises whenever there are 
information problems concerning borrowers—information problems which were at least 
part of the problems in the financial sector (reflected in the widely expressed concern 
over transparency.)    
 
Wage and price rigidities 
 
Traditional Keynesian discussions, growing out of Hicks’ IS-LM framework, focused on 
the role of wage and price rigidities.  If wages fail to fall when there is an excess supply 
of labor, there will be involuntary unemployment.  New Keynesian models, in this 
tradition, have sought to explain these wage rigidities. 
 
The policy prescription which might seem to follow from this analysis is that if one could 
restore full wage and price flexibility, then the economy would be restored to its full 
efficiency, and the problem of unemployment would be fully resolved.  The economy 
might still not be fully stable, simply because it is buffeted by shocks, e.g. to technology.   
Economists in this tradition have, accordingly, emphasized increased labor market 
flexibility.   
 
The focus on wage rigidities was particularly convenient for those who believed in well 
functioning markets and the conservative policy agenda:  it was government intervention 
and unions which were the source of the problem; limiting both would restore the 
economy to efficiency. 
 
While excessive labor market rigidities can obviously lead to unemployment, two 
observations are in order: first, while (under the hypothesis that wage rigidities are the 
only problem with the perfection functioning of the economy) restoring full wage 
flexibility would restore the economy to efficiency, it does not follow that more 
flexibility results in more stability.31  These are delicate matters of second-best 
economics, which become all the more important in conjunction with other market 
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failures.  In particular, in the absence of good insurance markets, greater wage flexibility, 
as we have noted, may be associated with greater economic volatility. 
 
Moreover, even in economies in which there are no artificial sources of rigidities—no 
unions, or unions only in a few sectors, and no (enforced) minimum wages—there is 
often unemployment.  This is, for instance, true in many developing countries.  
Efficiency wage theories32, in wage productivity depends on wages, provide an important 
set of explanations for why wages may not fall, even in the presence of high 
unemployment.   
 
Efficiency wage theories have important implications for stabilization policy, for they 
emphasize the endogeneity of wage setting in the economy (by contrast to the more 
simplistic rigid wage models).  Increased unemployment benefits, which in standard 
models help stabilize the economy, in the Shapiro-Stiglitz incentive based efficiency 
wage model, lead to more unemployment, as firms must raise wages to prevent workers 
from shirking.  More government employment in some versions of the labor-turnover 
efficiency wage model (Stiglitz [1972], Salop [   ]) can leave the unemployment rate 
unchanged, and only displace private employment.   While these effects may be present, 
they are likely overwhelmed by more standard effects:  as the economy goes into a 
recession, the costs of being fired increases significantly, even with increased 
unemployment benefits, so that shirking actually is reduced. 
 
(Efficiency wage theories have focused largely on real rigidities33, while traditional 
Keynesian analyses have focused on nominal rigidities.  The problem, however, is that 
nominal wages and prices are not rigid.  In the Great Depression, they fell at the rate of 
10% a year.  Today, again, there is worry about deflation.) 
 
Absence of futures markets and the role of expectations 
 
In the standard economic model, individuals do not have to form expectations about 
prices and wages in the future; there is a complete set of markets, specifying wages and 
prices in the future, in each contingency.   Macro-economics has rightly emphasized the 
importance of expectations—such futures markets simply do not exist.  Much recent 
research has focused on a special class of expectational models—that where expectations 
give rise to behavior which is in fact consistent with those expectations; the expectations 
are rational.   
 
Often, however, behavior in markets is hard to reconcile with such rational expectations; 
there is irrational exuberance, and irrational pessimism, in stock prices34.  There was no 
event that can account for the decline in stock prices by 25% in a few days in October, 
1987, that would explain how the present discounted value of future earnings or 
dividends should have declined by that magnitude. 
 
                                                 
32 See, for instance, Stiglitz [     ], Yellen [    ], Shapiro and Stiglitz [     ] 
33 Though because of problems of coordination, there can also be nominal rigidities.  See, e.g. Stiglitz [   ] 
34 See, e.g. Shilller 
In our earlier discussion, we stressed how different economists’ model of expectation 





Closely related is the fact that contracts are incomplete.  Of particular concern is the 
imperfect indexing of credit contracts, implying that a decrease in prices (or an increase 
in prices at a rate that is slower than expected) is associated with a redistribution from 
debtors to creditors.   Such redistributions can have large real effects, and the recognition 
that they may occur—which imposes huge risks on debtors—itself has large costs and 
affects behavior in important ways. 
 
Constraints                             
 
These are but one important example of imperfections in capital markets.  While 
imperfections of capital markets have long been discussed, the modern theory of 
asymmetric information has put such models on a firm footing.  They explain by credit 
and equity rationing, and accordingly why firms act in a risk averse manner, why balance 
sheet, cash flow, and credit availability matter, and why banks are important as 
institutions devoted to ascertaining credit worthiness, and monitoring and enforcing debt 
contracts.  These theories make sense of distinctions which have long played a role in 
policy discussions, such as that between firms that are insolvent, and those which are 
liquidity constrained:  in the absence of information imperfections, with a complete set of 




While imperfect and asymmetric information explains why product, labor, and capital 
markets behave markedly different from the way envisaged in standard competitive 
models—even when all market participants act in a perfectly rational way—another 
strand of recent research has attempted to explore systematically ways in which 
individuals behave that does not conform to standard postulates of rationality.  It has long 
been postulated that individuals exhibit money illusion, and are more resistant to a 
nominal wage cut than to a real wage cut.  There is some evidence of downward nominal 
price rigidities.  If that is the case, then the adjustment of relative prices may be more 
difficult when inflation (the rate of increase of average prices) is very low, and 




                                                 
35 This market failure can be related to the previous:  if expectations of future wages and prices depend on 
current wages and prices in an insufficiently flexible way, it means, in effect, that there is no full flexibility 
of wages and prices (as perceived today), and hence markets cannot fully adjust.  It may mean, for instance, 
that expected real interest rates are rigid.   
36 See, for instance, Akerlof et al 
To a large extent, macro-economics is about adjustments, including the adjustments to 
shocks.  The older literature on rigid wages and prices essentially assumed that wages 
and prices did not adjust, forcing the burden of adjustment on quantities.  As we noted, 
wages and prices do adjust, but different wages and prices adjust at different rates; asset 
prices adjust most rapidly; prices of “commodities” like wheat more rapidly than do 
prices of differentiated goods sold in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets.  Many of 
the peculiarities in the short run behavior of the economy can be related to particular 
features of dynamic processes.  For instance, exchange rate depreciations sometimes have 
a negative effect in the short run, contrary to the presumption that they should lead to an 
increase in aggregate demand.  The reason is that it takes time for new export orders to 
occur, and while exporters in which sales are denominated in dollars are better off (in 
domestic currency), those relying on imported raw materials are worse off.  The exporters 
may not expand production until new orders come in, while those relying on imports may 
face liquidity constraints in paying for the now more expensive imports.  Accordingly, 
they may contract production.  Similarly, to the extent that domestic expenditures on 
investment are complementary with imported investment goods, and liquidity constraints 
are binding, the higher price of imported investment goods may, in the short run, slow 
down the pace of investment—including expenditures on domestic investment goods.  
The impact effects of a currency deprecation can, accordingly, be negative. 
 
Much of the focus of short run policy making is on the fine details of these dynamics.  
We know, for instance, that firms typically delay hiring new workers until late in the 
recovery, as they become convinced that the recovery has really occurred.  In earlier 
stages, they rely more heavily on an increase in hours, even though such increases may 
be expensive, because of overtime pay.  That is why many recoveries are, at one stage or 
another, described as “jobless recoveries.”  But the fine structure of the dynamics can 
change from one cycle to another.  For instance, in earlier downturns, firms tended not to 
lay off workers—a phenomenon called labor hoarding37--and explained in terms of the 
high costs of hiring and firing workers; but in the most recent downturn, firms seem to 
have responded to a downturn in demand by laying off workers. 
       
 
Stabilization and growth 
 
Traditionally, stabilization policy has focused on aggregate demand, growth policy on 
aggregate supply, in particular, on increasing savings and investment, including 
investments in new technology.  One strand of modern growth theory (associated with 
Solow, 1956) argued that not only was the long term growth rate entirely dependent on 
the assumed exogenous rate of technological change and population growth, but that the 
level of per capita income in the long run depended (in a closed economy) only on the 
savings rate.  Issues of short run stabilization had no effect either on long term growth 
and steady state per capita income.    We do not want to discuss the broader issues of 
growth here, but only to suggest some of the links between short run stabilization policy 
and long term growth. 
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Policy debates have focused on the long run costs of excessive austerity and how policy 
affects the mix of outputs.  Obviously, countries have to live within their constraints. 
Some of the criticism of those who have enforced budget balance on developing 
countries accordingly seems misplaced.  There are, however, two criticisms that have 
some substance:  a) the accounting frameworks have sometimes imposed unnecessary 
stringency; and b) the international economic institutions have been excessively 
preoccupied with fears of inflation, and have not appropriately balanced the risks. 
 
The most striking example of excessive stringency imposed by the accounting framework 
were noted in the earlier discussion of accounting frameworks:  not including foreign aid 
into the government’s budget; consolidating government owned enterprise borrowing 
with the rest of the budget; and responding inappropriately to the budget deficits which 
increase after the privatization of social security.  But there are others:  some countries, 
like Chile, have created rainy day or stabilization funds, which are designed to be drawn 
upon in the event of an economic downturn.  But if such expenditures are treated just like 
any other form of deficit spending, and viewed as a “problem” then countries will be 
discouraged from self-financing deficit spending which could assist in their recovery.  
Similarly, in assessing how “worried” one should be about a deficit—at least in terms of 
incipient inflationary pressures—it makes sense to focus on the structural or full 
employment deficit.   
 
We noted earlier that there are always risks associated with economic policies.  
Governments have to balance off those risks, and critics of IMF policies have argued that, 
by focusing excessively on fears of inflation, they have harmed growth; this is especially 
the case in countries in which there was large excess capacity.  Russia in 1998 provides a 
striking example.  Output had declined some 30 to 40% since the end of Communism.  
The changing structure of demand and the lack of investment in intervening years had 
clearly contributed to a decrease in the country’s productive capacities.  The question 
was, had they contracted so dramatically—a level of economic devastation beyond that 
associated with the worst of wars.  Critics of IMF inspired policies argued that there was 
scope for an increase in aggregate demand, and that such an increase, while it might lead 
to some inflation, would also elicit an increase in aggregate supply.  Such an increase in 
output might restart the economy, and enhance future growth.  With the ruble devaluation 
in August 1998, the critics were provided correct:  while imports did not increase much, 
there was robust import substitution. 
 
By the same token, the IMF and the OECD warned against incipient inflation in the 
United States in 1995 and 1996, urging increases in interest rates to dampen the 
economy.  Studies at the Council of Economic Advisers had suggested that the NAIRU 
had fallen, perhaps dramatically.  The Council believed that the risks of inflation were far 
less than asserted by the IMF.  In the end, the Council proved correct, but that is not the 
point:  we felt that the IMF had not appropriately balanced the risks, that it had not 
weighed sufficiently the social and economic benefits that would come from the 
increased growth, and that it overweighed the costs of inflation and the costs of 
disinflation, should our judgment about the inflationary consequences prove wrong.   
 
Of particular concern are those situations where the consequences of a policy choice are 
long run, and not easily reversible.  The high interest rates imposed on East Asia led to 
massive bankruptcies (and predictably so, given the high level of indebtedness).  While 
the IMF said that, once matters came under control, interest rates would be lowered, the 
firms that had been forced into bankruptcy did not become unbankrupt.  There were long 
term consequences for growth from the short term policies.  Similar arguments apply to 
reductions in investme4nt in education or health. 
 
Inflation, as has been repeatedly noted, is important mainly as it affects real variables of 
concern, like growth and inequality.  Inflation is like a tax, and like any tax, there are 
inefficiencies associated with it; it discourages the use of non-interest bearing money.  In 
developing countries, of course, there are severe limitations on the ability to tax, and 
there may be large distortions with alternative taxes, especially as they are implemented 
in practice.  It remains an open question whether a moderate inflation tax may be, for 
some countries, a relatively efficient way of raising revenues to finance investment 
expenditures.38 
   
There are other important links between stabilization policy and growth.  Exchange rate 
policy may affect growth (at least in the short term) through several, sometimes 
conflicting, channels.39  Earlier, we noted the effect of exchange rates on the export 
sector, the import substitution sector, and on non-tradeables; there is are corresponding 
effects on investment, except that one needs to distinguish impacts on domestically 
produced investment goods and foreign produced imported goods.  Changes in the 
exchange rate have both impact effects and long run effects, as do expected changes in 
exchange rates.  For instance, expectations of a decline in exchange rates—e.g. with an 
overvalued but rationed currency today and a depreciated currency expected for the 
future—make investments (of foreign produced capital goods) particularly attractive.   
 
On the other hand, maintenance of a low exchange rate through the accumulation of 
reserves (as China has been doing in recent years) means that large amounts of resources 
are seemingly not being deployed; the several hundred billion dollars of reserves could, 
presumably, earn a higher return invested in, say, manufacturing than they earn in, say, 
U.S. Treasury bills.  Is China making a mistake in accumulating these reserves, an 
amount in excess of what they would need to stave off a speculative attack (especially 
since they restrict short term capital flows?)  Arguably, China’s first concern is the 
maintenance of as close to full employment as possible, and given the high domestic 
savings rate, it can muster all the domestic resources it needs for as high a level of 
investment as it can efficiently manage.  Its needs for foreign capital goods are limited to 
those that it does not produce at home, and exchange rate policy helps strengthen 
domestic capital goods industries.  The heavy flow of foreign direct investment provides 
a source of funding for the associated capital goods.  In short, a lower exchange rate 
                                                 
38 The fact, noted earlier, that the “optimal” inflation rate may be greater than zero suggests that this may in 
fact be the case.  (See Akerlof et al, op. cit.)  Note that taxes like the V.A.T. which induce relatively limited 
distortions in more advanced countries are likely to be far more distortionary in developing countries, 
simply because so much of GDP typically escapes taxation.  See Emram and Stiglitz.   
39 See Williamson 2003 
would be associated with a lower profitability in the tradeable sector, and this would 
adversely affect both employment and investment, and thus growth.  This affect almost 
surely dominates the fact that a higher exchange rate would make imported capital goods 
less expensive and that, somehow, some of the resources that are currently being hoarded 
in reserves would make their way into investment.   
 
 Policies which put the burden of adjustment on interest rates make borrowing riskier; in 
economies in which equity markets work very imperfectly (even in the most advanced 
industrial countries, a relatively small fraction of new investment is financed by the 
issuance of equity), this induces firms to borrow less.  Lower debt equity ratios slow 
down the pace of growth, and actually impede the allocative efficiency of the capital 
market:  it becomes more difficult to move resources those who have “excess” savings to 
those who have a deficiency.   
 
Other policies which expose the economy to greater risk (like capital market 
liberalization), of course, increase the riskiness of investment, and thereby discourage 
investment and growth.  The relevant question is the impact of the form or structure of 
the stabilization policy on growth.  Assume, for instance, that a focus on price stability 
results in less volatility in inflation, but more volatility in output.  Is investment more 
sensitive to volatility in inflation, or volatility in output?  Most standard theories would 
suggest the latter (so long as inflation is kept within bounds), and that indeed with 
variable rate loans, the real interest rate (the variable which standard theory says should 
be the focus of firms’ concern) varies little.    
 
Stabilization, growth, and poverty 
 
We have repeatedly emphasized the distributional consequences of alternative policies, 
and the fact that different parties bear the risks associated with different policies.  While 
it is often asserted that inflation is the cruelest tax on the poor, a more detailed look at the 
costs of inflation versus unemployment suggests the contrary, at least for many 
countries.40  Inflation hurts those with large money holdings (typically not the poor).  The 
poorest individuals in most economies work in competitive labor markets, with wages 
adjusting to real factors, such as the demand and supply of labor; such markets typically 
do not exhibit strong wage rigidities.  To be sure, workers in the formal manufacturing 
sector in economies in which there has not been a history of inflation will see their wages 
lag behind prices; but over time, wages again adjust, and if inflation is persistent, 
contracts adjust by including cost of living clauses.  In most countries, too, social security 
payments adjust for inflation, and even those who hold bonds will see interest payments 
rise (except if they have bought long term bonds.)   
 
                                                 
40 Empirical studies have often been highly misleading.  Periods of high inflation are often associated with 
real disturbances to the economy, such as the oil price shocks of the 70s; these real shocks have real 
consequences, and in some cases, those consequences may be borne disproportionately by the poor.  The 
question is not whether in inflationary episodes the poor have fared poorly, but whether, given whatever 
shocks, the poor fared better in those countries that maintained robust employment relative to those who 
fought inflation hardest. 
A similar analysis applies to the consequences of an unanticipated currency depreciation, 
which in some instances results in an increase in the prices of imported basic necessities, 
before the corresponding increases in wages, and thus leads to increased poverty.   
 
On the other hand, a low exchange rate, and perhaps even more so, an exchange rate that 
is expected to depreciate,  stimulates investments in and output of exports and import 
substitutes, and accordingly may be associated with employment creation and poverty 
reduction.  This is especially the case for a country, like China, in which there is an 
inadequately developed safety net:  the job creation associated with exchange rate policy 
is the anti-poverty policy. 
 
By contrast, the incidence of cyclical unemployment is disproportionately on the 
unskilled and low wage workers41; typically (though not always) higher skilled workers 
can displace a lower skilled workers, if he is willing to accept a wage cut. 
 
By the same token, the incidence the budget cuts associated with excessive budgetary 
stringency discussed in the previous section falls disproportionately on the poor, as public 
education and health are among the areas that are often cut.       
 
On average, of course, growth is associated with poverty reduction, and to the extent that 
stabilization policies promote or hurt growth, they may correspondingly reduce or 
increase poverty (relative to what it might otherwise have been.)  But some growth 
strategies are more pro-poor than others, and by the same token, some stabilization 
strategies are more pro-poor than others.  Those that succeed in stabilizing the economy, 
reducing the risk, are likely to be more pro-poor, precisely because the poor bear 




Market economies have always been subject to high levels of volatility.  In spite of 
progress in economic science, we not only have failed to eliminate this volatility; there is 
some evidence that it may have become even worse, with some hundred countries within 
the developing countries having experienced some form of crisis in the last three decades.  
Nor has progress in economic science eliminated some of the central controversies 
concerning the appropriate conduct of stabilization policies—those policies designed to 
stabilize the economy, to respond to downturns, and to prevent inflation.  In spite of the 
development of sophisticated econometric models to forecast the future of the economy, 
we remain uncertain not only about what will happen in each economy over the next few 
months, let alone the next few years; and we remain uncertain about the consequences of 
alternative policies.  What we do know is that the brunt of the risks is felt by different 
groups within society.  There is not a single policy which Pareto dominates all other 
policies.  Accordingly, we cannot simply delegate to technocrats the task of finding that 
Pareto dominant policy.  Economic policies inherently must be part of the political 
process.  This paper—and the work of the task force—is not intended to resolve these 
uncertainties, but to help lay out, more clearly, alternative views, to facilitate a 
                                                 
41 See for instance Furman and Stiglitz  other references 
democratic discussion of the alternatives, and more broadly, of the institutional 
frameworks within which the key macro-economic decisions are to be made.    
                                                                                                                                                                              
